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Strategies to Design Signals to Spoof Kalman Filter
Zhongshun Zhang, Lifeng Zhou and Pratap Tokekar
Abstract— We study the problem of designing spoofing sig-
nals to corrupt and mislead the output of a Kalman filter.
Unlike existing works that focus on detection and filtering
algorithms for the observer, we study the problem from the
attacker’s point-of-view. In our model, the attacker can corrupt
the measurements by adding spoofing signals. The attacker
seeks to create a separation between the estimate of the Kalman
filter with and without spoofing signals. We present a number
of results on how to generate such spoofing signals, while
minimizing the signal magnitude. The resulting algorithms are
evaluated through simulations along with theoretical proofs.
I. INTRODUCTION
As autonomous systems proliferate, there are growing
concerns about their security and safety [1], [2]. Of particular
concern is their vulnerability to signal spoofing attacks [3].
As a result, many researchers are designing algorithms that
enable an observer to detect and mitigate signal spoofing at-
tacks (e.g., [4]–[9]).We study the problem from the opposite
(i.e., the attacker’s) point-of-view. Our goal is to characterize
the capabilities of the attacker that is generating the spoofing
signals, while assuming that the observer is using a Kalman
filter for state estimation.
The problem of generating spoofing attacks has been
studied specifically for GPS signals. Tippenhauer et al. [3]
describe the requirements as well as present a methodology
for generating spoofed GPS signals. Larcom and Liu [10]
presented a taxonomy of GPS spoofing attacks.
The typical approach to mitigate sensor spoofing attacks
is by designing robust state estimators [11]. Fawzi et al. pre-
sented the design of a state estimator for a linear dynamical
system when some of the sensor measurements are corrupted
by an adversarial attacker [12]. We focus on the scenario
where the observer uses a Kalman Filter (KF) for estimating
the state using measurements that are corrupted by additive
spoofing signals by the attackers. We study the problem of
generating spoofing signals of minimum energy that can
achieve any desired separation between the KF estimate
with spoofing and without spoofing. We show that for many
practical cases, the spoofing signals can be generated using
linear programming in polynomial time.
The work by Su et al. [13] is most closely related to ours.
The authors show how to spoof the GPS signal without
triggering a detector that uses the residual in the Kalman
filter. They present a 1-step (greedy) online spoofing strategy
that solves a linear relaxation of a Quadratically Constrained
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Quadratic Program (QCQP) at each timestep. We present a
strategy that plans for T future timesteps, instead of just the
next timestep, while minimizing the spoofing signal energy.
Furthermore, we characterize the scenarios under which our
strategy finds the optimal solution in polynomial time.
Based on the motion model of the target and the evolution
of the KF, three problems for spoofing design are formulated
in Section II. Section III shows the approaches to solve these
optimization problems. The simulations for verifying spoof-
ing strategies are given in Section IV. Section V summarizes
the conclusion and future work.
Notation: We denote the set of positive real number by R+,
the set of positive integer by Z+. The set of real vectors with
dimension n is denoted by Rn, n ∈ Z+, and the set of real
matrices with m rows and n columns by Rm×n, m, n ∈
Z+. We write ‖·‖pp, p ∈ Z+ as the pth power of Lp vector
norm, E(·) as the expectation of a random variable, In as
the identity matrix with size n, n ∈ Z+, and N (µ, σ2) as
the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a scenario where an observer estimates the
location of a target using a KF in 2D plane. The target
misleads the observer by adding spoofing signals to the
observer’s measurement. We define the target’s motion model
as:
xt+1 = Fxt +But + ωt, (1)
where F,B ∈ R2×2, xt ∈ R2 is the position of the target,
ut ∈ R2 is the control input and wt ∼ N (0, R) is the
Gaussian process noise of the motion model with R ∈ R2×2.
The observer estimates the target’s position using linear
measurement model:
zt = Hxt + vt, (2)
where H ∈ R2×2 and vt ∼ N (0, Q) gives the measurement
noise with Q ∈ R2×2.
In order to mislead the observer, the target corrupts the
observer’s measurement by adding spoofing signal to mis-
lead the observer’s estimate. We assume the measurement
received by the observer is z˜t ∈ R2 with spoofing signal
(Equation (3)) instead of the true measurement zt ∈ R2
without spoofing signal (Equation (2)). The spoofing signal
t := [tx, ty]
T ∈ R2 adds additional measurement error:
z˜t = zt + t. (3)
The observer uses a KF to estimate target’s position with
initial distribution N (m0,Σ0). Since it receives the spoofing
measurement z˜t for updating, we denote distributions gener-
ated by the evolution of its KF as N (m˜t, Σ˜t) when step t ≥
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Fig. 1. The evolution of KF estimate by applying zt and z˜t, respectively.
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Fig. 2. Signal spoofing process and its effect on the observer’s KF
estimation.
1, t ∈ Z+. We also denote the distributions generated by the
evolution of a KF using true measurement zt as N (m˜t, Σ˜t).
The goal for the target is to set the separation between
the mean estimate mt and m˜t. The target’s spoofing signal
is each step within the planning horizon for which some
desired separation, dt ≥ 0, must be achieved (Figure 1).
Figure 2 shows the target’s spoofing process where it uses
the initial guess of N (m0,Σ0) denoted as N (m˜0, Σ˜0) and
desired separation dt to design spoofing signal t. In order to
avoid detection, the targets seeks to minimize the magnitude
of the spoofing signal. We first propose two problems for
offline scenarios as follows.
A. Offline Spoofing Signal Design with Known N (m0,Σ0)
If the target knows N (m0,Σ0) of the KF, then the target
can set N (m˜0, Σ˜0) equal to N (m0,Σ0).
Problem 1 (Offline with Known N (m0,Σ0)) Consider
a target with motion model (Equation (1)), measurement
model (Equation (2)), and spoofing measurement model
(Equation (3)). Assume target knows N (m0,Σ0). Find
a sequence of spoofing signal inputs, {1, 2, · · · , T } to
achieve desired separation dt between m˜t and mt at step
t. Such that,
minimize
T∑
t=1
γt · ‖t‖pp
subject to,
‖mt−m˜t‖pp≥ dpt , ∀t (4)
where γt ∈ R+ is a weighing parameter and T ∈ Z+ is the
optimization horizon.
B. Offline Spoofing Signal Design with Unknown
N (m0,Σ0)
Next we consider the case where the target does not
know the initial condition in the KF. Instead we assume that
the initial estimate m˜0, is not too far away from m0 (in
exception).
Problem 2 (Offline with Unknown N (m0,Σ0))
Consider a target with motion model (Equation (1)),
measurement model (Equation (2)), and spoofing
measurement model (Equation (3)). Assume the target
starts spoofing with m˜0, where E(m0 − m˜0) = M0 and
Σ˜0 6= Σ0. Find a sequence of spoofing signal inputs,
{1, 2, · · · , T } to achieve desired separation dt between
m˜t and mt (in expectation) at step t. Such that
minimize
T∑
t=1
γt · ‖t‖pp
subject to,
‖E(mt−m˜t)‖pp≥ dpt , ∀t (5)
where γt ∈ R+ is a weighing parameters and T ∈ Z+ is the
optimization horizon.
III. SIGNAL SPOOFING STRATEGIES
In this section, we show how to solve Problems 1 and 2
when p = 1 and p = 2. We first present the relationship
between the separation mt−m˜t and the initial bias m0−m˜0.
Theorem 1 Consider a target with motion model (Equa-
tion (1)), measurement model (Equation (2)), and spoofing
measurement model (Equation (3)). The evolutions of the
KFs by applying zt and z˜t give the distributions N (mt,Σt)
and N (m˜t, Σ˜t), respectively. The difference, mt − m˜t fol-
lows,
mt − m˜t =
t−1∏
i=0
At−i · (m0 − m˜0)+
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−j(Bt−1−i + Ct−1−i)
+Bt + Ct,
(6)
where At = F − K˜tHF, Bt = (Kt −
K˜t) [zt −H(Fmt−1 +But−1)] , Ct = −K˜tt.
The proof is given in the appendix.
Corollary 1 The expected value of the separation is,
E (mt − m˜t)
=
t−1∏
i=0
At−iM0 +
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−jCt−1−i
+ Ct. (7)
Proof: From Equation 6, E (mt − m˜t) follows,
E (mt − m˜t)
= E
t−2∑
i=0
i∏
j=0
At−j ·Bt−1−i +Bt
+
t−1∏
i=0
At−iE(m0 − m˜0) +
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−jCt−1−i
+ K˜tt.
The actual measurement is: zi = H(Fmi−1+Bui−1+wi)+
vi, where wi and vi are Gaussian noises with zero mean.
The expected measurement value is: E(zi) = H(Fmi−1 +
Bui−1) for all i, thus E[zi − H(Fmi−1 + Bui−1)] = 0.
Since E[Bi] = 0, we have,
E (mt − m˜t)
=
t−1∏
i=0
At−iE(m0 − m˜0) +
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−jK˜t−1−it−1−i

+ K˜tt.
(8)
Since we assume E(m0−m˜0) = M0 in Problem 2, the claim
is guaranteed.
Theorem 1 shows the difference between the two estimated
means at step t depends on the initial means, m0 and m˜0, and
the initial covariance matrices Σ0 and Σ˜0. This is because
the Kalman gain Kt depends on the covariance matrix Σt.
If target sets m0 = m˜0 and Σ0 = Σ˜0, it has Σt = Σ˜t for all
t since the covariance matrix is updated through the same
Kalman prediction and update equation (see appendix). Thus,
Bt = 02×2 and then Equation (6) can be simplified as:
mt − m˜t =
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−jCt−1−i
+ Ct.
As a result, mt − m˜t is independent of the measurements
{z1, z2, · · · , zt} when m0 = m˜0 and Σ0 = Σ˜0. Thus, the
target can generate spoofing signal inputs by solving Problem
1 offline. Similarly following Corollary 1, Problem 2 can be
solved offline as well.
Problems 1 and 2 are two nonlinear programming prob-
lems for arbitrary vector norms Lp. However, when p = 1,
they can be formulated as linear programming problems.
Linear programming can be solved in polynomial time [14].
When p = 2, they become QCQP (Quadratically Constrained
Quadratic Program). The following shows the LP and QCQP
formulations.
Theorem 2 If p = 1 and the elements in F and I−KtH are
all positive, then Problems 1 and 2 can be solved optimally
with linear programming. If p = 1 and the elements in
F and I − KtH are not all positive, then Problems 1
and 2 can be solved optimally with 4k linear programming
instances. If p = 2 and {H,F,Q,R} are diagonal matrices,
then Problems 1 and 2 can be solved optimally with linear
programming.
A. Linear Programming Formulation for L1 Vector Norm
Here, we will show how to formulate Problem 1 using
linear programming. A similar procedure can be applied to
formulate Problem 2 as linear programming.
The constraint in Problem 1 (Equation 4) follows:
‖mt − m˜t‖1=
∥∥∥∥∥∥
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−jCt−1−i
+ Ct
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
Aj+1 · K˜t−1−i · t−1−i
+ K˜tt
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥ dt, (9)
where t = 1, 2, · · · , T . ∏ij=0At−j ·K˜i ∈ R2×2 is a constant
matrix for each i ∈ {1, · · · , t − 1} and is calculated from
the KF iteration with initial covariance Σ0 and Σ˜0. Since L1
vector norm is the sum of the absolute values of the elements
for a given vector, Problem 1 can be directly formulated as
a linear programming problem when p = 1.
Then we show how to transform this constraint to a
standard linear constraint form Gtxt ≥ dt with xt :=
[1x, · · · , tx, 1y, · · · , ty]T . The left side of Equation (9)
can be formulated as
‖mt − m˜t‖1=
∥∥∥∥ a0 + a11x + · · · attx + · · ·+ a2ttyb0 + b11x + · · · bttx + · · ·+ b2tty
∥∥∥∥
1
(10)
where a0, a1, · · · , a2t, b0, b1, · · · , b2t are corresponding co-
efficients from Equation 6.
Lemma 1 If the elements in matrices F and I −KtH are
positive, then ‖mt−m˜t‖1 is a linear combination of |ix| and
|iy|, and Problem 1 can be solved as a single LP instance.
Proof: According to the proof of Theorem 1 appendix,
all the coefficients {a1, ..., a2t, b1, ..., b2t} are positive if the
elements in matrices F and I−KtH are positive. Therefore,
the objective function and the constraints are linear in |ix|
and |iy|. There always exists an optimal solution where all
ix ≥ 0 and iy ≥ 0 or where all ix ≤ 0 and iy ≤ 0. The
objective function in both cases will be the same. Without
loss of generality, we can assume ix ≥ 0 and iy ≥ 0, which
can be solved using a single LP instance.
The linear programming strategy containing k con-
straints is presented in Algorithm 1. G denotes ma-
trix in the linear constraint Gx ≥ Dk where x :=
[1x, · · · , Tx, 1y, · · · , Ty]T and Dk is the collection of k
nonzero separations dt, t ∈ {1, · · · , T}.
If Lemma 1 does not hold, it is possible that some
elements in a0, a1, · · · , a2t, b0, b1, · · · , b2t can be positive
and some are negative. In general, there are four different
cases depending on the sign of the first row and the sec-
ond row for considering each constraint ‖mt − m˜t‖1≥ dt
(Equation 10). Then we can obtain four linear optimization
problems along four different sub-constraints of each con-
straint ‖mt−m˜t‖1≥ dt. Thus, in the worst case, the optimal
solution can be obtained by solving 4k linear optimization
problems. We run Algorithm 1 4k times by changing the sign
Algorithm 1: Linear Programming Formulation
1 Initial← {(xo,Σ0, F,H,B,Q,R, u}
2 G← 0k×2T
3 Calculate Kalman gain K˜1, · · · , K˜T
4 for q = 1 : k
5 for i = 1 to the qth value in Dk //Equation (17)
6 g =
∏T−1
j=i Aj+1K˜i
7 Gq,i = sum of all rows in g
8 Return G
of rows in g (Line 6) appropriately.
B. Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Program Formula-
tion for L2 Vector Norm
When p = 2, Problems 1 and 2 can be formulated as
QCQPs [15]:
minimize
1
2
xT P0x
subject to − 1
2
xT D
T
t Dtx + d
2
t ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}
(11)
where x = [21x, 
2
1y, · · · , 2Tx, 2Ty]T , P0 = I2T , and
Dt ∈ R2T×2T :=
∏t−1
j=1Aj+1K˜0 · · · 0 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
0 · · · ∏t−1j=t−1Aj+1K˜t−1 0 0 0
0 · · · 0 K˜t 0 0
0 · · · 0 0 0 0
0 · · · 0 0 0 . . .

Unfortunately, the QCQP formulations for these three
problems are NP-hard since the constraint in each problem
is concave. If F,B,H, Σ˜0 are diagonal matrices, it can be
shown that Dt is also a diagonal matrix. We can transform
the QCQP formulation to a linear programming problem by
using change of variables {2tx, 2ty}, t = {1, 2, ..., T}, and
using a procedure similar to p = 1.
If Dt is not a diagonal matrix, one solution is to apply
the inequality
√
2‖x‖2≥ ‖x‖1 between L1 vector norm and
L2 vector norm. The constraint can be changed to L1 vector
norm, which is a stricter constraint. A sub-optimal solution
can be obtained by using the L1 vector norm.
C. Receding Horizon: Spoofing with online measurement
Problems 1 and 2 describe the offline versions for spoof-
ing. We also extend the offline problems to an online version.
The following formulates an online spoofing scenario.
Consider a target with motion model (Equation (1)),
measurement model (Equation (2)), and spoofing measure-
ment model (Equation (3)). Assume the target does not
know N (x0,Σ0). It collects a series of measurements
{zreal1 , zreal2 , · · · , zrealto } from step 1 to current step to. Find
a sequence of spoofing signal inputs, {to , to+1, · · · , to+H}
to achieve desired separation dt between m˜t and mt (in
expectation) within future H steps. Such that
minimize
t0+H∑
t=t0
γt · ‖t‖pp
subject to,
‖E(mt−m˜t)‖pp≥ dpt , ∀t ∈ {to, · · · , to +H} (12)
where γt ∈ R+ is a weighing parameter, to is the current
time, and H is the predictive time horizon. The target applies
t = to as spoofing signal input at each step t.
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we simulate the effectiveness of spoofing
strategies for Problems 1, 2 and online case (Section III-
C) where a target designs spoofing signals t to mislead an
observer by achieving the desired separations dt between mt
and m˜t.
We consider the L1 vector norm and use the following
models,
F =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, B =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, u =
[
1
1
]
,
R =
[
0.5 0
0 0.5
]
, Q =
[
0.5 0
0 0.5
]
.
Set the weight γt = 1 for all t. Our code for simulation is
available online.1
For Problem 1, set the initial condition for the KF as,
Σ0 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, m0 =
[
0
0
]
.
Since the target knows N (x0,Σ0), it sets m˜0 = m0 and
Σ˜0 = Σ0. We first consider a scenario where the target wants
to achieve the desired separation at steps, t = 5, 10, 15,
denoted as d5 = 1.77, d10 = 3.54 and d15 = 5.30 with
the optimization horizon T = 20. The target generates a
sequence of spoofing signals {1, · · · , 20} offline by using
a linear programming solver. The spoofing performance is
shown in Figure 3-(a) where the true separations are the
same as the desired separations. Same successful spoofing
achieved when the desired separations are chosen as dt =
0.25t‖u‖2, t = {3, ..., 15}, as shown in Figure 3-(b).
In Problem 2, the target knows E(m0 − m˜0) = M0
but does not know Σ0. The spoofing result is no longer
deterministic but holds in expectation ‖E(mt − m˜t)‖1≥ dt.
Figure 4-(a) shows spoofing signals for desired separations
as d1 = 2 with T = 6 and M0 = 1. Set N (m˜0, Σ˜0)
as N (0, 1.5I2), m0 as a random variable (m0 ∼ N (1, 1))
and Σ0 = I2. In order to see the effectives of the spoofing
signals {1, · · · , 5}, we conduct 100 trials for each desired
separation d2 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Figure 4-(b) shows the ‖m1−
m˜1‖1 is no longer deterministic, but ‖E(m1−m˜1)‖1 is close
to the desired value d1 = 2.
For online case, spoofing signals are continuously gener-
ated by using receding horizon optimization with new noisy
measurements. We set the receding horizon as H = 15. Even
1https://github.com/raaslab/signal_spoofing.git
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Fig. 3. Offline signal spoofing with known (m0,Σ0).
though offline strategy performs comparatively as online
strategy (Figure 5), online spoofing strategy achieves almost
the same separation as the desired, while offline strategy has
certain divergence (Figure 6). This is because online strategy
can update the measurement at each step. Figure 7 shows the
online strategy applies less total spoofing magnitude than
offline strategy.
V. CONCLUSION
We study the problem spoofing signals to achieve any de-
sired separation between a Kalman filter estimate without and
with spoofing signals. Our main approach was to formulate
the problems as nonlinear, constrained optimization problems
in order to minimize the energy of the spoofing signal. We
show that under some technical assumptions, the problems
can be solved by linear programming optimally. We also
present a more computationally expensive approach to solve
the problem, without the aforementioned assumptions.
Our immediate future work is to study the game-theoretic
aspects of the problem. In this work, we did not consider
any active strategy being employed by the observer to detect
and/or mitigate the attack. In future works, we will consider
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Fig. 4. Offline signal spoofing with unknown (m0,Σ0).
the case of designing spoofing signals that explicitly take
the attack detection and/or mitigation strategies into account.
In all the problems considered in this paper, the desired
separations are taken as inputs provided by the user. Instead,
we can optimize over the desired separation trajectory in
order to avoid detection by the observer.
APPENDIX
A. KF and Kalman gain update
Suppose the true measurement is zt, the KF estimation is:
xt|t−1 = Fxt−1|t−1 +But, (13)
xt|t = Fxt|t−1 +Kt(zt −Hxt|t−1), (14)
where Kt is the Kalman gain and is given by:
Kt = (FΣt|t−1F ′ +Rt)H ′(HΣt|t−1H ′ +Qt)−1. (15)
According to the Kalman gain update equation (15), the
evolution covariance matrix at step t, Σt, only depends
on the state model parameters and the initial condition of
the covariance matrix Σ0. The Kalman gain at step t, Kt
depends on the covariance matrix Σt. Both Σt and Kt do not
depend on the control input series {ut}t=1,··· ,k, measurement
{zt}t=1,··· ,k. Thus, the covariance matrix and the Kalman
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gain can be predicted from the KF covariance update steps.
Σt+1|t = FΣt|tFT +Rt,
Σt+1|t+1 = (I −KkH)Σt+1|t.
(16)
From the equation (16), the Kalman gain can be predicted
from the initial condition Σ0.
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B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: From the update of KF, we have
mt = mt|t−1 +Kt(zt −Hmt|t−1)
= (I −KtH)mt|t−1 +Ktzt
= (I −KtH)(Fmt−1 +Buu−1) +Ktzt.
(17)
and
m˜t = (I −KtH)(Fmt−1 +Buu−1) +Kt(zt + t).
Recursively,
mt − m˜t
=(I −KtH)(Fmt−1 +Buu−1) +Ktzt
− [(I − K˜tH)(Fm˜t−1 +Buu−1) + K˜t(zt + t)]
=(F −KtHF )mt−1 − (F − K˜tHF )m˜t−1
− (Kt − K˜t)HBut−1 + [Ktzt − K˜t(zt + t)]
=(F − K˜tHF )mt−1 − (F − K˜tHF )mt−1
− (Kt − K˜t)HBut−1 + (Kt − K˜t)zt − K˜tt
− (Kt − K˜t)HFmt−1
=(F − K˜tHF )(mt−1 − m˜t−1)
+ (Kt − K˜t)[zt −H(Fmt−1 +But−1)]− K˜tt.
(18)
Let
At = F − K˜tHF,
Bt = (Kt − K˜t)[zt −H(Fmt−1 +But−1)],
Ct = −K˜tt.
Then,
mt−m˜t
=At(mt−1 − m˜t−1) +Bt + Ct
=At[At−1(mt−2 − m˜t−2) +Bt−1 + Ct−1] +Bt + Ct
...
=
t−1∏
i=0
At−i · (m0 − m˜0) + (Bt + Ct)
+At(Bt−1 + Ct−1) +AtAt−1(Bt−2 + Ct−2) · · ·
+At · · ·A3A2(B1 + C1)
=
t−1∏
i=0
At−i · (m0 − m˜0) +Bt + Ct
+
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−j(Bt−1−i + Ct−1−i)
 .
(19)
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